




In 1981 the Federal Reserve System adopted a
new pricing policy for certain correspondent banking
and other services, such as check clearing and settle-
ment, supplied by Reserve Banks. The new policy
was mandated by the Monetary Control Act of 1980,
which gave all depository institutions equal access to
Federal Reserve clearing services and required that
prices charged for those services be set so as to
reflect all costs of production, including an allowance
for taxes, a return to capital, and all other expenses a
private sector firm would bear.
Federal Reserve Banks have supplied correspon-
dent banking services to the banking industry
throughout most of their history. Before 1980 only
member banks had direct access to all Federal Re-
serve clearing services. They received these services
free of charge as partial compensation for the cost of
the non-interest-bearing reserves they were required
to hold. Private correspondent banks and clearing-
houses supplied clearing services to nonmember banks
and other depository institutions such as thrifts and
credit unions.
When Congress granted equal access to Federal
Reserve services it recognized that this action would
put the Fed in more direct competition with private
correspondent banks. The pricing requirements in-
cluded in the act were intended to enable private
firms to compete with the Fed. Pricing was also
seen as a way of encouraging more rational resource
utilization, since there was little incentive to conserve
on the use of Fed services when no explicit prices
were charged.
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* This article grew out of a research project originally
undertaken with Ward McCarthy, formerly an economist
with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, but cur-
rently associated with Merril Lynch Economics. In
addition to Mr. McCarthy, the author wishes to acknowl-
edge helpful comments by Marvin Goodfriend, David
Humphrey, Tom Humphrey, David Mengle, Bruce Sum-
mers, and John Walter. Any remaining errors or omis-
sions are the sole responsibility of the author.
1 Another reason Congress required the Fed to price
certain of its services was to offset the cost to the U. S,
Treasury of  the lower reserve  requirements  brought
This article describes and evaluates the pricing
methods adopted by the Federal Reserve. Issues
related to Fed pricing can be divided into two cate-
gories. The first pertains to the determination of
imputed private sector costs; the second to the allo-
cation of those costs to individual service prices.
Sections II and III describe and analyze the methods
used in cost determination, while Sections IV and V
do the same for cost allocation. Conclusions are
stated in Section VI.
II. IMPUTING THE COST OF CAPITAL
TO THE FEDERAL RESERVE
The cost of capital is by far the most important of
the costs the Federal Reserve must impute to its
priced services, Accordingly, most of the analysis of
cost determination focuses on capital financing costs.
A detailed description of the methods used to deter-
mine imputed costs follows a review of some relevant
aspects of the theory of capital finance.
Factors Determining the Cost of Capital
Capital goods, by definition, yield a stream of
productive services over an extended length of time.
The cost of capital refers to the price of capital ser-
vices. As the name suggests, the cost of capital
measures opportunity cost. It is the expected rate
of return on alternative investment opportunities
that bear the same amount of risk.
Investors in financial markets determine the cost
of capital. Firms finance capital investment through
the sale of financial assets such as equity shares, or
stocks, and bonds. Market prices of those financial
about by the Monetary Control Act. Revenue considera-
tions were not responsible for the legislative provisions
requiring the Fed to recover imputed private sector costs,
however. Instead, those provisions were intended to
foster competition and promote efficient resource alloca-
tion, as noted in the text. A detailed account of the
legislative debate over Federal Reserve pricing can be
found in Anatoli Kuprianov, “The Monetary Control Act
and the Role of the Federal Reserve in the Interbank
Clearing Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
Economic Review  71 (July/August 1985): 23-35.
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pected to earn. All other things equal, the lower the
expected return the lower will be the market value
of a firm’s outstanding financial assets. Because
investors typically demand a premium in exchange
for greater risk, the cost of capital is higher for firms
that undertake riskier investments.
A firm’s cost of capital can be expressed as the
total expected return to investors divided by the
market value of outstanding financial assets. That
ratio, in turn, can be expressed as a weighted average
of the expected rate of return to equity and the
interest rates paid on outstanding debt.
In a market economy prices allocate resources.
The cost of capital, as determined in financial mar-
kets, determines how capital is allocated. A firm
will invest in capital if the expected rate of return on
investment is at least equal to the cost of capital at
the margin ; otherwise, the market value of its out-
standing equity will fall until the expected rate of
return to shareholders once again equals the expected
return on other investments bearing equivalent risks.
Assuming firms attempt to maximize their market
value, capital will be allocated to investments with
the highest expected return for a given amount of
risk. A firm that is unable to earn a rate of return
at least equal to its cost of capital over the long run
will experience difficulty in attracting capital from
investors.
The Cost of Capital to the Federal Reserve
Federal Reserve Banks, because of their unique
status as quasi-governmental agencies, are not subject
to the same market forces confronting private firms.
Although they are legally privately owned institu-
tions, their stock is issued only to member banks and
cannot be bought or sold in financial markets. More-
over, dividends paid on that stock are fixed by law
at a six percent annual rate, with all remaining reve-
nues net of expenses turned over to the U. S. Trea-
sury. Thus, unlike a purely private firm, the cost of
capital to the Fed is not determined in financial
markets. Nevertheless, capital acquired by the Fed
does have an opportunity cost. For capital used in
the production of priced clearing services, that oppor-
tunity cost is reflected in the cost of capital faced by
its competitors in the private sector.
Capital Structure Assumptions
Total imputed financing costs for Federal Reserve
priced service operations are determined by the asset
base (the value of capital assets devoted to priced
services), the assumed capital structure (the propor-
tions of equity and debt used to finance the asset
base), and the imputed rate of return to equity and
interest rates on debt. Table I summarizes the
capital structure assumptions applied to the priced
services asset base. Overall capital structure is
determined by matching different types of assets with
separate funding sources. This matched-book capital
structure,  as it is termed, treats long-term assets as
being financed by a mix of equity and long-term debt,
while short-term assets are assumed to be financed
by short-term debt.
Assets classified as long-term are physical assets,
such as buildings and equipment. Short-term assets
consist of working capital; that is, funds needed to
conduct a firm’s day-to-day transactions. Prepaid
expenses, materials and supplies, and receivable ac-
counts reflect such funding needs.
Imputed financing costs for the assets listed in
Table I are recovered using two different methods.
The Fed distinguishes between assets directly related
to the production of priced clearing services and
other assets used to facilitate the clearing and settle-
ment of payments transactions. Financing costs for
long-term assets and working capital are determined
using a financial model of large bank holding com-
panies and recovered through a mark-up added to
service prices. Self-financing assets earn separate
and identifiable income streams apart from the fee in-
come earned from the sale of priced clearing services.
Two types of self-financing assets are listed in
Table I. The first is Federal Reserve float. The
cost of float is largely recovered through separate
charges against institutions that receive credit for
checks and other items before the Fed receives the
funds for those items. Clearing balances are deposits
held with Reserve Banks (in addition to required
reserves) to facilitate the transfer of funds associated
with the transactions they process.
2 Funds obtained
from clearing balance deposits are assumed to be
invested in short-term government securities. This
2 Although the Monetary Control Act imposes uniform
reserve requirements on all depository institutions, some
institutions may not hold sufficient reserves directly with
Reserve Banks to facilitate clearing and settlement. Situ-
ations such as this can arise because reserve requirements
can be satisfied by vault cash holdings or by reserve
accounts, known as pass-through reserve accounts, ad-
ministered by private correspondent banks for their
respondents. Institutions are required to hold separate
clearing balance deposits as a condition for receiving Fed
services in these cases to prevent the occurrence of over-
night overdrafts. Banks that otherwise hold sufficient
reserves for clearing purposes can also hold clearing
balances in addition to required reserves.
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Net items in the process of collection (float)
Imputed reserve requirements
Investment in marketable securities
1 Imputed financing costs determined using the bank holding company model.
2 Imputed cost is the federal funds rate.
3 Cost of funds determined by the earnings credit rate paid on clearing balances deposited with Federal Reserve Banks.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Financial Results of Federal Reserve Priced Services Operations,”
(November 20, 1985).
assumption is reflected in the two asset accounts
corresponding to clearing balance liabilities in Table
I. The Federal Reserve pays implicit interest on
designated clearing balances in the form of earnings
credits that can be used to pay for its priced services.
Imputed earnings on the funds placed in the corre-
sponding asset accounts offset the cost of these earn-
ings credits to the Federal Reserve. The treatment
of self-financing assets is described in greater detail
at the end of this section.
The Bank Holding Company Model
A financial model of large bank holding companies
is used to impute a cost of capital to the Federal Re-
serve. The bank holding company model adopted by
the Fed uses financial data on the twenty-five largest
bank holding companies in the United States to esti-
mate the average pre-tax rate of return on capital
for the sample.
3 That estimated rate of return is
3 Because of unique circumstances, one of the twenty-
five largest bank holding companies was removed from
the sample used to calculate the targeted rate of return
for 1986, and another holding company was substituted
in it place. 50 Federal Register 47,624 (November 19,1985).
then used to determine a targeted rate of return on
long-term assets and working capital. As noted
above, imputed financing costs for these two cate-
gories of assets are recovered through a mark-up
added to service prices.
The resulting targeted rate of return is a pre-tax
rate. It reflects both the imputed after-tax rate of
return and corporate income taxes that would be
levied against the pre-tax return. The pre-tax rate
of return to capital can be expressed as a weighted
average of the pre-tax rate of return to equity and
the interest rates paid on outstanding debt. Formally
stated, that expression is
where the variable r represents the aggregate pre-tax
rate of return to capital, r 1 the after-tax rate of return
to equity, t the average corporate tax rate, r 2 the
average interest rate paid on long-term debt, r 3 the
average short-term interest rate, and a 1, a 2, and a 3 the
proportions of equity, long-term debt, and short-term
debt used to finance capital investment.
Accounting data taken from the financial state-
ments of the bank holding company sample are used
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of return. An estimated rate of return calculated on
the basis of accounting data is termed a  book  rate of
return. Book rates of return can be contrasted with
market rates, which are calculated using market data
on actual returns earned by investors. A formal
derivation of the rate of return formula used in the
bank holding company model is presented in the
shaded box on the opposite page. A description of
how the variables appearing in that formula are cal-
culated follows.
The procedure used to determine the average rate
of return earned by the bank holding company sample
can be divided into three steps. First, the pre-tax
rate of return to equity, r 1/(1-t), is estimated. This
term measures both the cost of equity finance and
corporate income taxes. Second, interest rates on
long-term debt, r 2, and short-term debt, r 3, are esti-
mated. Third, the assumed financial structure (re-
flected by the weights a 1, a 2, and a 3) is determined.
4
The Pre-Tax Rate of Return to Equity Determin-
ing the pre-tax rate of return to equity requires three
steps. In the first step the after-tax rate of return is
calculated by dividing after-tax profits by the book
value of outstanding equity. This yields an estimate
of the variable r l.
Average corporate income tax rates are estimated
by dividing actual taxes paid, with an adjustment
that adds back the tax benefits that banks get from
holding municipal bonds, by gross income. Deferred
taxes are excluded from the estimated tax rate. The
imputed tax rate is then determined as a weighted
average of the estimated tax rates for each of the
holding companies in the sample. The weights used
to compute the sample average are individual holding
company profits divided by total profits for the entire
sample.
Finally, the pre-tax rate of return to equity is
determined by dividing the after-tax rate, r l, by
(l-t), where t denotes the average tax rate. The
values of r l and t used in this final step are three-
year moving averages of the sample averages.
4 Information on the bank holding company model was
gathered from  a series of Federal Register  notices pub-
lished by the Federal Reserve Board: 46  Federal Register
1,338 (January 6, 1981); 49 Federal Register 11,251
(March 26, 1984); 49  Federal Register 44,556 (Novem-
ber 7, 1984); and 50  Federal Register  47,624 (Novem-
ber 19, 1985).
Interest Rates  An imputed interest rate on long-
term debt is determined by averaging the interest
rates paid on all outstanding long-term debt for the
holding companies sampled. The short-term interest
rate is estimated in the same way, except that demand
deposits and other deposits subject to interest rate
ceilings are excluded from the calculation. Because
banks often pay implicit interest in the form of free
gifts or services for deposits subject to interest rate
ceilings, explicit interest rates provide downwardly
biased estimates of the true cost of these funds.
Since implicit interest payments are difficult to esti-
mate, all such deposits are excluded from the calcu-
lation of the cost of short-term debt finance.
Capital Structure  The weights a 1, a 2, and a 3 ap-
pearing in the bank holding company rate of return
formula are determined on the basis of the matched-
book capital structure assumption described earlier.
Long-term assets are assumed to be financed by a
mix of equity and long-term debt. Proportions of
equity and long-term debt, represented by the vari-
ables a l and a 2, are based on the corresponding pro-
portions observed for the bank holding company
sample. The sum a l + a 2 is determined so as to
equal the proportion of long-term assets in the bank
holding company model asset base, which is composed
of long-term assets and working capital. The variable
a3 is the share of working capital in the asset base.
The cost of finance for working capital is r 3, the
short-term interest rate.
Other Imputed Private Sector Costs
The estimate of the pre-tax cost of capital obtained
using the bank holding company model includes an
imputed allowance for the cost of corporate income
taxes. However, Federal Reserve Banks, because of
their nonprofit status, are also exempt from certain
sales taxes that private firms are required to pay. A
separate allowance for such taxes is therefore added
to the total cost recovery target.
Other imputed expenses include an allowance for
federal deposit insurance assessments, based on total
clearing balances, and Federal Reserve Board staff
expenses attributable to priced services development.
As part of this last allocation, a portion of Board
assets are added to the priced services asset base.
5
5 49 Federal Register 11,251 (March 26, 1984).
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Interest Rates and the Return to Equity
The financial model of large bank holding and short-term debt, To see this, first note that
companies used by the Federal Reserve to the pre-tax rate of return to equity, denoted by
determine its imputed cost of capital is based the variable r e, is the ratio of pre-tax profits to
on a formula that breaks down the aggregate the value of outstanding equity. Formally,
rate of return to capital into a weighted average
of the pre-tax rate of return to equity and the
interest rates paid on long- and short-term debt.
In the derivation that-follows, all variables
represent accounting data that appear in bank
holding company financial statements.
The average yields on long-term debt, r 2, and
short-term debt, r 3, are defined as
Consider a firm that finances its investments
by issuing a mix of equity shares, long-term
debt, and short-term debt. Let the variable s
represent the book value of the firm’s outstand-
ing equity, b 1, the book value of long-term debt, 
and
and b 2 the value of short-term debt., The aggre-
gate book value, v, of all claims against the
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BANK HOLDING COMPANY MODEL
Two  ultimate goals  underlie the pricing policy for
Federal Reserve services mandated by the Monetary
Control Act. The first is to give private sector firms
an opportunity to offer competing services. The
second is to bring about an efficient use of economic
resources.
To be able to compete with the Federal Reserve,
private firms must  perceive an opportunity  to earn a
rate of return at least equal to their cost of capital.
8 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MARCH/APRIL 1986Other types of float are charged directly to
the parties receiving the resulting extension of
credit. Institutions that close during midweek
must pay the cost of float generated by such
closings.
4 Banks receiving early credit for
checks drawn against banks in other districts
must pay for the resulting float.6
Because ACH transactions are not affected by
the same factors that can delay check collection,
ACH float is a smaller problem than check float.
When data processing problems or network
transmission delays result in the creation of
ACH float, the associated costs are allocated to
ACH overhead expenses and recovered through
service fees. Float resulting from midweek
closings is priced in much the same way as
check float in corresponding cases.
6
Financial institutions can choose among one
of two payments options for float. They can
either authorize the Fed to directly debit their
reserve or clearing accounts for the cost of float
arising from interterritorial check deposits or
from midweek closings, or they can have their
reserve or clearing account balances adjusted
after the fact by the amount of float received
over that period. These “as of” adjustments,
as they are termed, reduce the amount of earn-
ings credits paid on clearing balances or, alter-
natively, require holding higher required
reserve balances in subsequent days to meet
average reserve requirements.
4 Nonstandard holidays are treated differently from
midweek closings, however. Nonstandard holidays
are state holidays during which Federal Reserve
Banks and most banks nationwide are open for
business. In cases where banks are legally required
to close for a state holiday, credit to the sender of
an item is deferred to the next business day, 12
C.F.R. Part 210 (Regulation J, Collection of Checks
and Other Items and Wire Transfer of Funds).
5 48 Federal Register 10,753 (March 14, 1983).
6 49 Federal Register 6,564 (February 22, 1984).
That opportunity can exist only if the targeted rate
of return  to capital incorporated into Federal Reserve
service prices reflects the cost of capital faced by its
potential competitors.
A pricing policy that encourages competition is also
efficient from the standpoint of economic theory.
The cost of capital is, by definition, the opportunity
cost of capital. An opportunity cost  is the cost of
foregone alternatives. In a market economy decisions
regarding resource allocation are based on percep-
tions of relevant opportunity costs. When prices
reflect true opportunity costs, they give purchasers
incentives to use different goods and services only so
long as the value they place on those items is at least
as great as the cost to society of producing them.
The resulting outcome is efficient in the sense that it
allocates resources to the production of goods and
services most valued by market participants.
These considerations suggest that the bank holding
company model can be evaluated on the basis of how
well it estimates the cost of capital faced by private
firms that compete with the Federal Reserve. That
evaluation criterion is adopted in the following
analysis.
Evaluation Criteria
Determining the appropriate targeted rate of return
to capital poses a number of difficult methodological
problems. These problems, however, are not unique
to the Federal Reserve. Regulatory agencies such as
public utility commissions have long been  faced
with a similar task. These agencies attempt to deter-
mine service prices  that permit regulated firms to
earn rates of return high enough to attract capital
without yielding monopoly profits.
The pricing methodology adopted by the Federal
Reserve closely resembles the rate-setting methods
commonly used by regulatory agencies. Rate-setting
methods for regulated industries have received a
great deal of attention from economists. It seems
reasonable, therefore, to apply the same evaluation
standards developed to analyze public utility pricing
to the methodology adopted by the Federal Reserve.
Kolbe, Read, and Hall have proposed two theo-
retical evaluation criteria for analyzing rate-setting
methods used in public utility regulation.
6 The  first
is a test for consistency with economic theory.  This
test looks at the assumptions and procedures used to
estimate the cost of capital to determine whether they
are consistent with accepted economic theory.  The
second criterion is a test of the logical consistency of
the rate-setting procedure.  Its  purpose is to deter-
mine whether a rate-setting procedure can be logi-
cally expected to achieve certain goals.
6 A. Lawrence Kolbe and James A. Read, Jr, with
George R. Hall, The Cost of Capital, Estimating the
Rate of Return for Public Utilities (Cambridge: The
MIT Press, 1984), chap. 3.
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Consistency with economic theory is a useful evalu-
ation criterion because theory identifies the oppor-
tunity costs relevant to decisions affecting resource
allocation. A great deal of published data, especially
accounting data, measure historical costs rather than
opportunity costs. Because market conditions change
over time, historical cost data generally provide poor
estimates of current opportunity costs. Unfortu-
nately, exact measures of opportunity costs, such as
the cost of capital, are not always available. In such
cases, economic theory can be used to develop esti-
mation methods that are free from systematic bias.
Viewed from this perspective, the purpose of the
test for consistency with theory is to determine
whether a rate-setting procedure utilizes the best
available methods to estimate true opportunity costs.
The Difference between Realized Returns and the
Cost of Capital As noted earlier, the pre-tax cost of
capital can be expressed as a weighted average of the
expected pre-tax rate of return to equity and the
interest rates paid on debt issued to finance new in-
vestment. The cost of capital differs from the realized
return to capital in that it is an expected rate of
return. Using the notation developed earlier, the
pre-tax weighted average cost of capital can be ex-
pressed as
where now E(r) denotes the expected aggregate
pre-tax rate of return to capital, or cost of capital;
E(r l) the expected return to equity, which measures
the cost of equity; t the marginal tax rate on new
investment; r 2 and r 3 the interest rates paid on long-
and short-term debt issued to finance new invest-
ment; and a l, a 2, and a 3 the targeted proportions of
debt and equity used to finance new investment.
The bank holding company model uses historical
returns to estimate the cost of capital. Two implicit
assumptions underlie that approach. The first is that
the average historical book rate of return yields good
estimates of the past cost of capital to the banking
industry. The second is that the historical cost of
capital can be used to infer the cost of capital cur-
rently faced by its private sector competitors.
Whether these assumptions are justified can be deter-
mined by examining available evidence on the be-
havior of capital markets.
There are a number of reasons why the cost of
capital can differ from historical rates of return.
First, past returns to equity can differ from the
expected rate of return. Second, fluctuations in
market interest rates change the cost of issuing new
debt. Third, tax laws do not, as a general rule, treat
different types of capital investment equally ; more-
over, those laws are periodically revised so that effec-
tive marginal tax rates on new investment can differ
from tax rates on past investment. Finally, financing
decisions, reflected by the weights a 1, a 2, and a 3, may
differ at the margin for new investments. Each of
these issues must be considered in evaluating different
methods of estimating the cost of capital.
Estimating the Cost of Equity As residual claim-
ants to the income earned by a firm, shareholders
bear two types of risk. Business risk refers to the
risk inherent to the activities a firm engages in ; i.e.,
risk stemming from capital investment. Financial
risk is created when investment is financed by bor-
rowing. The more highly leveraged a firm is the
more variable are rates of return earned by share-
holders and the greater is the risk of default. Both
of these sources of variability in earnings determine
the risk premium demanded by shareholders. Firms
that bear similar business and financial risks should,
according to theory, face the same cost of equity.
The bank holding company model estimates the
historical cost of equity to large holding companies
by averaging past realized rates of return earned by a
sample of firms. Two implicit assumptions underlie
that approach. The first is that the cost of equity
faced by the nation’s twenty-five largest holding com-
panies is the same. The second is that expected rates
of return to equity equal subsequent realized rates on
average. The last assumption is commonly made in
economic research and, at least in the case of market
equity returns, appears to be empirically justified.
7
Because changes in market conditions can cause
rates of return to fluctuate over time, the bank
holding company model uses a three-year average of
past rates of return to determine the imputed cost of
equity. Basing the imputed cost of equity on a simple
average of historical rates assumes that the cost of
equity is constant over the sample period. The last
7 Studies have found that capital markets are efficient in
the sense that market prices of financial assets fully
incorporate all publicly available information about the
firms issuing those securities. Under certain assump-
tions, market efficiency implies that discrepancies be-
tween realized and expected rates of return should be
zero on average. See, for example, Eugene F. Fama,
“Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work,” The Journal of Finance  25 (May
1970): 383-417. A more recent survey can be found in
Thomas E. Copeland and J. Fred Weston!  Financial
Theory and Corporate Policy, 2d ed. (Reading, Mass.:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1983), chap. 10.
10 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MARCH/APRIL 1986assumption is a strong one, but has some empirical
justification. Studies have found that market rates
of return for virtually all firms whose stocks trade in
organized markets are uncorrelated over time. Eu-
gene Fama has noted that such behavior is consistent
with the joint hypothesis that markets are efficient,
in the sense that expected rates equal realized rates
on average, and that the expected rate of return to
equity is constant over time.
8
An alternative approach more commonly used to
estimate the cost of equity to firms is based on the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The Capital
Asset Pricing Model specifies rates of return to
risky assets as a function of their covariance with a
diversified market portfolio. A principal result of
that model is that only undiversifiable risk, that is,
the portion of the variation in equity returns corre-
lated with the returns to a fully diversified market
portfolio, determines the risk premium demanded by
shareholders. In recent years the Capital Asset
Pricing Model has gained increasing acceptance in
public utility rate-setting hearings.
More recently, Arbitrage Pricing Theory has
begun to replace the CAPM as the dominant analyt-
ical framework used in research into capital market
behavior. Arbitrage Pricing Theory is more general
than the Capital Asset Pricing Model in that it relates
equity returns to a number of other factors in addi-
tion to the return earned on a diversified portfolio.
As with the CAPM, Arbitrage Pricing Theory can
be used to estimate the cost of equity to firms. The
CAPM can be viewed as a special case of Arbitrage
Pricing Theory.
The above discussion has assumed that market
rates of return are used to estimate the cost of equity.
As noted earlier, however, the bank holding company
model uses book rates of return based on accounting
data. Differences between book rates of return and
market rates are examined below.
return earned by shareholders are the sum of the
dividend yield, the ratio of dividends to the market
value of equity, and any capital gains or losses to
shareholders resulting from changes in the market
value of equity. Market rates of return are the
theoretically correct measure of shareholder earnings.
Book rates of return typically differ from market
rates. Kolbe, Read, and Hall note two principal
reasons for these discrepancies.
8 See Eugene F. Fama,  Foundations of Finance  (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), chap. 5.
First, the market value of a firm’s equity will
typically differ from its book value. Although there
is reason to believe that investors’ expectations are
correct on average, realized returns in specific cases
can differ markedly from initial expectations. When a
firm’s earnings fall short of expectations, for example,
the market value of its outstanding equity falls until
the expected rate of return to equity is once again
equated with the cost of equity. Thus, when market
value is less than book value the book rate of return
will tend to understate the true rate. Conversely,
when market value exceeds book value the book rate
overstates the true rate.
Second, book rates of return use accounting profits
to measure the return to equity. Accounting profits
may differ systematically from true economic returns,
however. Standard accounting procedures typically
do not recognize changes in asset values, except when
assets are disposed of. Moreover, depreciation sched-
ules used in standard accounting practices are arbi-
trary from an economic point of view. To the extent
that accelerated depreciation schedules used for tax
purposes overstate the true rate of depreciation, for
example, accounting profits may understate profits.
Finally, generally accepted accounting principles
allow considerable discretion in the way income can
be reported. It is thus theoretically possible for two
firms that earn the same true incomes to report quite
different accounting profits. Moreover, there is no
evidence that these discrepancies will cancel out on
average.
9
It would be a straightforward task to incorporate
market rates of return into the bank holding company
model. Available evidence suggests that market rates
would yield better estimates of the cost of capital
than book rates.
The Cost of Borrowing  Unlike the expected re-
turn to equity, data on market interest rates are
readily available. Interest rates paid on debt con-
tracted in the past do not reflect the cost of borrowing
to finance new investment: current market interest
rates do. Therefore, estimates of the cost of capital
should be based on currently prevailing market inter-
est rates.
Measuring Effective Tax Rates  Tax laws stipulate
both a legal or statutory tax rate and rules that
specify how taxable income for a firm must be com-
puted. Accounting conventions required by tax laws
9 Kolbe, Read, and Hall,  The Cost of Capital,  pp.
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preciation schedules used for tax purposes, for ex-
ample, rarely correspond to true economic depreci-
ation. Consequently, effective tax rates can differ
systematically from statutory rates. Effective tax
rates can be either higher or lower than statutory
rates, depending on whether depreciation schedules
used to compute taxable income understate or over-
state true depreciation.
Special tax concessions, such as the investment tax
credit on purchases of new machinery and equipment,
also influence effective tax rates. Investment tax
credits act to lower effective marginal tax rates on
income earned from such investments.
Thus, although the maximum statutory tax rate on
corporate income is 46 percent, recently liberalized
depreciation allowances and investment tax credits
produce effective marginal tax rates on income from
new investment that are much lower. A recent study
by the U. S. Treasury reports estimates of effective
marginal tax rates in the range of -8 to 20 percent
on equipment and 40 percent on structures.
10
The bank holding company model uses average tax
rates, calculated as the ratio of taxes actually paid
(with an adjustment that adds back the tax benefits
banks receive from holding municipal bonds) to
pre-tax profits, to estimate the effective tax rate for
the holding company sample. As with the imputed
cost of equity, the imputed tax rate is based on a
three-year average of estimated historical tax rates
for the bank holding company sample. For 1986 the
imputed tax rate is 37.6 percent.
11
While average tax rates do reflect the aggregate
effects of depreciation allowances and investment tax
credits on total taxes paid by firms, they do not
necessarily measure effective marginal tax rates on
income from new investment. Research on corporate
income taxation reveals that average tax rates have
systematically overstated effective marginal tax rates
in recent years. An article by Alan Auerbach has
analyzed the reasons for this finding.
12 Three factors
10 These  estimates  apply to equity-financed investments
and assume a four percent real rate of return to equity
and a five percent inflation rate. Effective tax rates for
different types of equipment vary with depreciable life-
times; effective tax rates are generally higher for assets
with longer depreciable lifetimes. In addition to longer
depreciable lifetimes, structures face a higher effective
tax rate because they are not eligible for the investment
tax credit. U. S. Treasury Department,  Tax Reform for
Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth,  vol. 2 (No-
vember 1984), p. 156.
11 50 Federal Register  47,627 (November 19, 1985)
12 Alan J. Auerbach, “Corporate Taxation in the United
States,”  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2
(1983) : 451-505.
discussed by Auerbach are relevant to the evaluation
of the Federal Reserve’s method of imputing taxes.
First, some firms may earn a rate of return to
capital that is in excess of a competitive return. Such
excess returns may reflect the entrepeneurial ability
of management or the exercise of market power
rather than a return to capital. To the extent that
these excess returns do not come from depreciable
capital, they face a marginal tax rate of 46 percent.
Auerbach argues that the taxation of excess returns
is not directly relevant to the incentives to invest in
fixed capital, but is incorporated in measured average
tax rates.
Second, average tax rates reflect effective tax rates
on different vintages of capital. The Economic Re-
covery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 have reduced effec-
tive tax rates on income from depreciable capital
below rates prevailing in the pre-1981 period. Capital
acquired before these tax law changes is effectively
taxed at higher rates than those applied to new capital
investment. Moreover, the depreciation allowances
permitted for tax purposes tend to overstate true
economic depreciation. Compared to true income,
taxable income is lower during the early years of an
asset’s life and higher in later years. As a result,
effective tax rates on income from older vintages of
capital tend to be higher than those on new invest-
ment. Estimates of effective tax rates based on
accounting data measure the average tax rate on
different vintages of capital and thus do not accu-
rately reflect the lower effective tax rate on income
from new investment. The practice of averaging
estimated tax rates over time further exacerbates
this problem.
The third and final point deals with asymmetries
in the treatment of gains and losses. While corporate
earnings are taxed at a positive rate, the tax on
operating losses, which are negative earnings, is zero.
Firms that operate at a loss are unable to exploit tax
preference such as the investment tax credit. Thus,
average tax rates overstate the effective marginal tax
rate on new investment. While firms that incur losses
do have limited options to carry those losses over,
such options do not correct for the bias introduced
by the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses.
To conclude, estimates of tax rates that are based
on accounting data do not measure the effective mar-
ginal tax rate on income from new investment. The
relatively higher tax rates on income from past capital
investment reflected in such data represent sunk
costs, which are not relevant for current investment
decisions. Imputed tax rates applied to Federal
12 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MARCH/APRIL 1986Reserve priced service operations should be set so
as to reflect effective tax rates on new investment.
Such a policy would be consistent with the goal of
pricing in a manner that permits entry by private
sector competitors.
Using Effective Marginal Tax Rates to Impute
Taxes  Imputed tax rates for Federal Reserve priced
services could be calculated using a methodology simi-
lar to that employed in economic studies of effective
corporate tax rates on U. S. industry.
13 To start, im-
plicit user costs would have to be calculated for each
type of asset. These user costs would be computed
so as to reflect the present value of tax benefits, such
as depreciation allowances and ‘the investment tax
credit where applicable. Total imputed financing and
tax costs could then be determined by aggregating
imputed earnings for each asset.
It should be noted that the procedure suggested
above does not correspond to rate-setting practices
employed by public utility commissions. Regulated
utilities are permitted to recover actual tax liabilities
incurred as a result of past tax laws. In competitive
markets, however, prices are determined by prevail-
ing opportunity costs. The cost of new investment
does not depend on effective tax rates on capital pur-
chased in the past, but on current tax laws. Rate-
setting procedures that base prices on actual tax
liabilities effectively protect shareholders of regulated
firms from capital gains and losses resulting from
changes in tax laws. Nonregulated firms, however,
are not protected from such risks. The procedure
outlined above would therefore be more consistent
with economic theory.
Logical Consistency
The test for logical consistency attempts to deter-
mine whether a rate-setting procedure can be logically
expected to attain its goals. The ultimate goals of
Federal Reserve pricing are to permit private sector
entry into the markets it serves and also to promote
efficient resource allocation. Both of these goals are
attained when the targeted rate of return to capital
reflects the true cost of capital faced by private sector
competitors. Therefore, the logical consistency of
the Federal Reserve’s rate-setting procedure can be
judged by whether it can be expected to produce
targeted rates of return that equal the true cost of
capital on average.
13A review of these methods is contained in Alan J.
Auerbach, “Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy and the
Cost of Capital,” Journal of Economic Literature 21
(September 1983) : 905-40.
The Problem of Circularity  At present  the Fed-
eral Reserve bases its targeted rate of return on the
average historical book rate of return earned by a
sample of firms it views as its principal competitors.
Rates of return earned by these competitors are deter-
mined in part by the prices the Fed charges for its
services, however. A recent congressional report on
Federal Reserve pricing practices noted that this
could lead to a potential circularity problem.
14 If
targeted rates of return are set too low, as can happen
when book rates of return are below market rates,
correspondent bank earnings can be adversely affected
by Federal Reserve pricing policy. To the extent
that correspondent bank earnings are measurably
affected by Fed pricing policy, subsequent targeted
rates of return would be based on artificially de-
pressed earnings that are themselves a product of the
rate-setting procedure. In this case, as long as tar-
geted rates continue to be based on book rates of
return, the rate-setting procedure cannot logically be
expected to target the true cost of capital.
It could be argued that the circularity problem is
unimportant as a practical matter because correspon-
dent banking services account for only a small share
of revenues earned by bank holding companies. Ac-
cording to this argument, revenues earned from ac-
tivities such as commercial lending, for example, are
likely to be relatively more important than revenues
from the sale of services such as check clearing
(which is the principal area of competition between
the Federal Reserve and commercial banks) in deter-
mining overall rates of return for the holding com-
pany sample.
This argument was acknowledged in the congres-
sional report. That report, however, also noted that
the argument calls into question the assumptions
underlying the adoption of the bank holding company
model. Use of the bank holding company model is
predicated on the assumption that, because the largest
bank holding companies are the Federal Reserve’s
principal competitors, the cost of capital to those
firms should determine the targeted rate of return for
priced services. But when a firm engages in a
number of different activities its cost of capital for
different investment projects will, as a general rule,
differ because different projects do not carry the same
risks. Thus, an estimate of the cost of capital based
on  overall rates of return earned by bank holding
14 The Role and Activities of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem in the Nation’s Check Clearing and Payments Sys-
tem, Report of The Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary
Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 98 Cong. 2d sess., pp. 41-43.
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payments services even if the bank holding company
sample does include the Federal Reserve’s major
competitors. Implicitly, then, the bank holding com-
pany model assumes that the cost of capital for in-
vestment projects related to payments services is the
same as the average cost of capital faced by large bank
holding companies. This is a strong assumption, and
one that is difficult to either prove or disprove. It is
worth noting, however, that bank holding companies
are not the Fed’s only competitors. In the market for
automated clearinghouse services, for example, a non-
banking firm has recently begun to compete with the
Fed.
A Suggested Alternative Procedure  Problems
with circularity are not unique to Federal Reserve
pricing. They are also encountered with rate-setting
procedures commonly employed by public utility
commissions. Indeed, the pricing methodology
adopted by the Federal Reserve is based on such
commonly used procedures. The problem of circu-
larity is therefore a familiar one to regulatory econ-
omists.
As an alternative to the bank holding company
model, the congressional report cited earlier sug-
gested using the Capital Asset Pricing Model in con-
junction with data on market rates of return for a
broad-based sample of U. S. industry. The proposed
methodology outlined in the report is one that has
gained increasing acceptance among public utility
commissions in recent years.
15
Adoption of a broad-based ‘sample of U. S. indus-
try was suggested as a means of dealing with the
potential problem of circularity. Firms included in
this larger sample should ideally bear risks that are
comparable to those facing suppliers of correspondent
banking services. To some extent, the CAPM could
be used to adjust for differences in financial risk
across the sample.
Using market rates of return could help mitigate
any potential problems with circularity because mar-
ket forces cause equity prices to adjust until the
expected return to equity and the cost of equity are
equated. Thus, to the extent that Federal Reserve
pricing policy does affect correspondent bank earn-
ings, subsequent realized rates would not deviate
systematically from expected rates as book rates of
return would.
15 It is also the methodology that appears to be favored
by regulatory economists. See, for example, Kolbe, Read,
and Hall, The Cost of Capital, chap. 3.
These suggestions appear to offer a means of
improving the current procedure. However, the pro-
posed methodology is not without its own short-
comings. First, the CAPM has itself been subject to
criticism on theoretical grounds because it assumes
that the covariance of returns with the market port-
folio is the only factor determining the risk premium
expected by shareholders. As noted earlier, Arbi-
trage Pricing Theory is not subject to the same
criticisms.
Second, adoption of the method described above
would also require the Fed to resolve a number of
difficult problems not normally encountered in other
types of rate-setting procedures. The weighted-
average cost of capital depends not only on the cost
of equity finance, but also on the cost of issuing debt
and the overall financial structure. In determining
allowable rates of return for privately owned public
utilities, the firm’s financial structure need not be
assumed or imputed. The amount of outstanding
debt, the interest rates paid on that debt, and the
debt-equity ratio are all given.
In contrast, estimating the appropriate cost of
equity finance for the Federal Reserve is only the
first step in determining the overall imputed cost of
capital. If bank holding companies are not used as a
model of financial structure, then some other model
must be adopted. A more appropriate model is not
immediately evident, however. Finally, because the
financial structure of banks tends to differ from that
of other types of firms, it could prove difficult to
select a sample of firms from other industries that
bear comparable business and financial risks. For the
present, these latter issues remain unresolved.
IV. COST ALLOCATION
As the nation’s central bank, the Federal Reserve
System bears responsibility for discharging a variety
of tasks. Fed services are grouped into four general
categories : ( 1) Monetary Policy, (2) Supervision
and Regulation, (3) Treasury, and (4) Financial
Institutions and the Public. Monetary policy can be
characterized as a nonexcludable public good, and
would therefore be difficult to price explicitly since
everyone benefits whether they pay or not. Bank
supervision has some attributes of a public good,
although the Federal Reserve is the only federal bank
regulatory agency that does not charge for exami-
nations. Treasury, or fiscal agency functions, are not
priced because the Federal Reserve routinely turns
over all surplus revenues to the Treasury. Corre-
spondent banking and payments services fall into the
14 ECONOMIC REVIEW, MARCH/APRIL 1986fourth category. The Monetary Control Act requires
these services to be priced.
16 Pricing is feasible for
these services because they have the characteristics of
private goods.
Because not all services are priced, costs attribut-
able to priced services must be identified and sepa-
rated from other costs. Sales of priced services vary
among Reserve Banks, so individual cost recovery
targets must be set for each Bank. Finally, separate
cost recovery targets must be set for each individual
priced service line.
The Private Sector Adjustment Factor
Operating expenses are allocated to different ser-
vices using a cost accounting system known as PACS
(Planning and Control System). PACS also deter-
mines the value of capital assets devoted to priced
services. (See insert for more details.) Capital
financing costs and other imputed private sector costs
are distributed to the different priced service lines
using a uniform mark-up over operating expenses
known as the Private Sector Adjustment Factor
(PSAF).
As a first step in calculating the PSAF, total
capital financing costs are determined using (1) the
estimated financial cost of capital from the bank
holding company model, and (2) the value of the
priced services asset base obtained from the PACS
accounting system. If the variable r represents the
imputed pre-tax cost of capital and K the value of
the asset base, then total imputed capital and cor-
porate income tax costs, denoted by the variable CC,
are given by :
CC = rK.
Other PSAF adjustments include allowances for
sales taxes, federal deposit insurance assessments,
and a portion of expenses incurred by the staff of the
Board of Governors. Strictly speaking, these imputed
costs should be classified as operating expenses.
However, the PSAF cost allocation procedure groups
them together with imputed capital and income tax
costs. For purposes of this discussion, therefore, the
variable CC should be regarded as representing
capital costs plus the other imputed private sector
costs mentioned above.
16 The fourth category also includes a number of ser-
vices that are not priced. The basic service lines subject
to the pricing requirements of the Monetary Control Act
are: (1) currency and coin services, (2) check clearing
and collection services, (3) wire transfer services, (4)
automated clearinghouse services, (5) settlement services,
(6) securities and safekeeping services, (7) float, and any
new services the Federal Reserve offers.
Cost Accounting Methods
The Federal Reserve’s Planning and Control
System (PACS) was designed initially as a
budget expense and control system, but was
modified to serve as a cost accounting system
capable of meeting the requirements of pricing.
PACS performs three basic tasks. First, it
identifies all direct expenses incurred as a result
of separate activities. Second, it allocates over-
head expenses to different service lines. Third,
it allocates capital assets to different services so
that imputed capital financing costs can be
determined.
Identifying the direct expenses” incurred in
producing different services is, at least in prin-
ciple, a straightforward task, and one that
PACS was originally designed to perform.
Like other cost accounting systems, PACS
allocates direct expenses, such as wages and
salaries, to different services.
Allocating indirect, or overhead, expenses
poses a more difficult problem. Examples of
overhead activities include Bank administration,
personnel administration (including recruiting
and placement and wage and salary admini-
stration), and protection (security services).
PACS uses estimates of the proportion of over-
head expenses attributable to each activity to
allocate overhead expenses. For example, costs
associated with personnel administration are
allocated according to the ratio of personnel
employed by each service, while cost alloca-
tions for Bank administration are determined
by the ratio of direct expenses incurred by
different priced services. Expenses arising
from security services, on the other hand, are
allocated according to a survey of the percent-
age of manhours devoted to protection of valu-
ables.
The priced services asset base is determined
using a direct determination method that allo-
cates all single purpose assets directly to the
activity employing them. Some capital assets,
termed joint-purpose assets, are used for a
variety of different purposes. A good example
of a joint purpose asset would be a Federal
Reserve Bank building, which typically houses
all activities performed by the Bank. Joint-
purpose assets are allocated to different services
in much the same way as overhead expenses ;
that is, based on estimates of usage. Assets
used in overhead activities are allocated to in-
dividual services based on overhead expense
allocation ratios.
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penses together with overhead expenses measured
and calculated by PACS. Let the variable OE
represent total operating expenses, including non-
capital overhead expenses, allocated to priced ser-
vices. The PSAF mark-up is the ratio of imputed
private-sector costs to all other operating expenses:
CC
PSAF = OE
Notice that, multiplying this ratio by total operating
expenses, OE, would just recover total imputed costs.
In calculating the PSAF, aggregate cost data for
all the Federal Reserve Banks and all priced services
are used. The resulting mark-up is applied uniformly
to all services offered by Reserve Banks to arrive at
separate cost recovery targets. To see how the pro-
cedure works, let OEij denote total expenses allocated
to activity i (where activity i represents a particular
priced service) at bank j. Then, total private sector
expenses imputed to that activity are determined by
the product PSAF x OEij.
For services such as check clearing, for which
prices may vary by region, separate cost recovery
targets are determined for each Reserve Bank. Other
services such as electronic funds transfer have prices
set uniformly on a nationwide basis. Cost recovery
targets for those services are determined on the basis
of aggregate systemwide costs incurred in producing
the service, calculated by summing service costs
across all Reserve Banks.
Notice that the PSAF cost allocation procedure is
not intended to recover “overhead” expenses in the
sense that that term is usually understood. The Fed’s
accounting conventions group overhead expenses
other than capital costs together with other routine
operating expenses in the variable OE. In contrast,
the overhead mark-ups used by private-sector firms
typically include all indirect overhead expenses (such
as the cost of personnel management services) to-
gether with capital financing costs in the numerator
of the mark-up ratio. The PSAF ratio is often mis-
takenly interpreted as representing such a mark-up.
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that
this is not the case.
Allocation of Imputed Costs
Now consider the effects of this allocation proce-
dure on individual cost recovery targets. Notice that
the imputed cost allocation to service i at bank j can
be equivalently stated as :
where :
total direct expenses incurred by Reserve Bank j in
providing some projected amount of service i. From
the above expression it is evident that using the same
systemwide PSAF to impute capital and tax costs to
separate activities amounts to weighting total imputed
costs by the ratio of expenses incurred in providing
service i at bank j to expenses for the system as a
whole. Consequently, those services that are rela-
tively costly to provide in terms of noncapital ex-
penditures are also allocated a relatively larger share
of capital and other imputed private sector costs.
Similarly, regional Reserve Banks having relatively
high noncapital costs in relation to other Reserve
Banks are required to bear a relatively larger share
of imputed private sector costs. The resulting cost
allocation may or may not accurately reflect true
underlying costs.
V. EVALUATION OF THE PSAF
COST ALLOCATION METHOD
Like the bank holding company model, the PSAF
cost allocation method resembles rate-setting methods
commonly used in public utility regulation. These
methods are reviewed and evaluated below and the
analysis is applied to the PSAF methodology.
Fully Distributed Cost Pricing Methods
Fully distributed cost pricing refers to a variety
of average cost pricing methods. Under this type of
pricing, total projected revenue requirements are
fully distributed on a per-unit cost basis and prices
are set so as to satisfy those requirements. Such
pricing methods are commonly used in public utility
rate-setting proceedings to allocate targeted capital
cost recoveries and other joint production costs to
different types of services.
17 The PSAF mark-up
used by the Federal Reserve is an example of fully
distributed cost pricing.
17 For a more complete description of different fully
distributed cost pricing methods used in public utility
regulation, see Alfred E. Kahn,  The Economics of Regu-
lation: Principles and Institutions,  vol. 1 (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), pp. 150-58.
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tributed cost pricing methods lies with their relative
simplicity. A second reason for the popularity of
these methods stems from the widespread perception
that they allocate costs fairly. By definition, fully
distributed cost pricing imposes equal mark-ups on all
services. It thus avoids the appearance of discrimina-
tory treatment of different classes of customers.
Evaluation of Fully Distributed
Cost Pricing Methods
Prices perform the task of allocating resources in a
market economy. Economists therefore evaluate
different pricing methods according to whether re-
source allocations resulting from those methods are
efficient. In addition to economic efficiency, policy-
makers are also concerned with the issue of equity.
Discriminatory pricing policies are prohibited under
existing antitrust laws. The analysis that follows
evaluates fully distributed cost pricing methods ac-
cording to the criteria of efficiency and equity.
Economic Efficiency  As a general rule economic
theory finds that efficient resource allocation is
attained when prices are set so as to reflect under-
lying marginal costs. Marginal costs measure the
opportunity cost of the resources used to produce
different goods and services. Efficient resource allo-
cation requires that the ratio of prices charged for
different goods and services equal the corresponding
ratio of marginal costs, or that prices be proportional
to marginal costs. When these conditions are satis-
fied, prices charged for different goods and services
reflect the true cost to society of producing those
items. From an operational standpoint, then, differ-
ent pricing methods can be evaluated using depart-
ures from marginal costs as a guide to losses in eco-
nomic efficiency.
18
A special case arises when production is subject to
economies of scale. This is typically the case for
public utilities. Certain services produced by the
Fed also appear to be subject to economies of scale.
19
When scale economies exist, marginal costs are below
average costs so that strict marginal cost pricing will
not recover total costs. In this case, efficient resource
allocation is attained by setting prices in inverse pro-
18 This is the approach taken by Kahn,  The Economics
of Regulation,  in his analysis of fully distributed cost
pricing methods.
19 See David B. Humphrey, “Costs, Scale Economies,
Competition, and the Product Mix in the U. S. Payments
Mechanism,” Staff Studies 115 (Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, 1982).
portion to demand elasticities.
20 A second-best solu-
tion involves either two-part pricing (e.g., an access
charge plus a per-unit service fee reflecting marginal
costs), or setting prices proportional to marginal
costs so that total costs can be recovered while leaving
price ratios equal to ratios of marginal costs. 
For firms that produce a single output the last
method amounts to average cost pricing. When a
firm produces more than one output, however, pro-
duction may involve joint costs. Joint costs exist
when the same productive inputs are used to produce
more than one type of output; for example, Reserve
Bank buildings in the case of the Fed. When pro-
duction is subject to joint costs, marginal costs are
determined according to causal responsibility. The
marginal cost of a good or service is the cost that
could be avoided if the last unit of output were not
produced, holding production of all other outputs
fixed.
Unfortunately, marginal costs may be difficult to
determine when production relies on joint inputs.
For this reason, fully distributed cost allocation
methods are often used to allocate joint production
costs. In general, fully distributed cost allocations
differ from marginal costs. But because marginal
costs can be difficult to measure, precise measures of
efficiency losses resulting from the use of fully dis-
tributed cost allocation methods are difficult to deter-
mine. Indeed, the cost of implementing true marginal
cost pricing can exceed the economic value of effi-
ciency gains resulting from such a policy. Thus, total
economic costs may be lower under fully distributed
cost pricing than under marginal cost pricing. This
could occur if, for example, departures of fully dis-
tributed costs from marginal costs are small while
the added cost of implementing marginal cost pricing
is large.
Arguments such as the one above are frequently
made to justify the use of fully distributed cost
pricing methods. Unless some attempt to measure
marginal costs is made, however, there may be no
way to judge whether these methods really are rela-
tively efficient.
Equity  Price discrimination occurs when price
differentials do not reflect differences in the under-
lying cost of selling to different purchasers. By
20 For a more complete discussion of efficient pricing see
William J. Baumol and David E. Bradford, “Optimal
Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing,”  American Eco-
nomic Review 60 (June 1970): 265-83.
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criminatory.
21 As noted by Alfred Kahn, “It is fair,
as a general rule, to impose costs on people when and
to the extent that they impose costs on society.”
22
Antitrust laws generally permit firms to charge
price differentials when those differentials are based
on differences in cost. Marginal cost pricing is there-
fore permissible under those laws. In view of the
above considerations, marginal costs can be used as a
standard to evaluate the fairness of different pricing
methods in cases where marginal cost pricing is
feasible.
Although fully distributed cost pricing methods are
generally viewed as being fair, economic theory would
classify them as discriminatory to the extent that the
resulting prices depart from marginal costs. Impos-
ing equal mark-ups may appear to be fair, but it does
not always insure that purchasers pay the true cost
of the goods and services received. The perception
that fully distributed cost pricing methods are equi-
table continues to enjoy widespread, if misguided,
acceptance, however, and such pricing practices have
not been found to violate antitrust laws.
An Evaluation of Federal Reserve
Pricing Practices
The preceding discussion suggests that fully dis-
tributed cost pricing methods can produce outcomes
that are less than ideal from the standpoint of eco-
nomic theory. In the case of Fed pricing policy,
however, the existence of competition provides an
independent check of cost allocation practices and
mitigates the distortionary effects of inappropriate
pricing decisions when they occur.
Economic theory predicts that firms operating in
purely competitive markets will price according to
marginal costs. Under these conditions the issues of
efficiency and equity are resolved by the market. In
contrast, competition is restricted in regulated mar-
kets such as those served by public utilities so that
regulatory agencies take the place of the market in
determining prices. Rate-setting methods used by
those agencies are shaped by the goals of efficiency
and equity, but the definition of equitable pricing
behind the adoption of those methods do not always
agree with the economist’s notion of that term.
21 For a more detailed discussion of price discrimination,
see. F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Eco-
nomic Performance  2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1980), chap. 21.
22 Alfred E. Kahn, “The Road to More Intelligent Tele-
phone Pricing,”  Yale Journal of Regulation  1 (1984): 146.
Debate over appropriate standards of equity and
efficiency that should guide Fed pricing policy is a
less contentious issue because the Fed must compete
with private sector suppliers. As long as aggregate
imputed costs are estimated correctly, an inappropri-
ate allocation of costs between different service lines
would result in some services becoming relatively
overpriced while others are underpriced. If that
happened, the Fed would find it difficult to retain
market share for those services that are relatively
overpriced, thus making it difficult to continue indi-
rectly subsidizing relatively underpriced services.
Thus, the presence of competition makes it difficult
for the Fed to adhere to a pricing policy that might
otherwise result in inefficient resource allocation or
unequitable treatment of certain customers.
Market-Sensitive Pricing  In response to market
forces and to minimize the distortionary effects of
fully distributed cost pricing the Fed has instituted
market-sensitive pricing for individual services with-
in a service line. While overall cost recovery targets
for broadly defined service lines, such as commercial
check clearing and ACH, are partly determined by
the PSAF mark-up, prices for individual services
comprising those service lines are set in response to
market forces. Market-sensitive pricing is efficient
to the extent that the PSAF mark-up allocates total
imputed capital costs to each service line appropri-
ately.
A feasible alternative to the current practice of
allocating costs using a uniform mark-up would be to
set targeted cost recoveries based directly on capital
assets allocated to each service line by the PACS
accounting system, in effect creating a separate mark-
up, or PSAF, for different service lines. The result-
ing cost allocation should more closely approximate
true marginal costs.
Imputed Deposit Insurance Costs There is at least
one other area, namely imputed deposit insurance
expenses, where marginal cost pricing principles
could be applied to Fed pricing. At present, these
expenses are allocated together with imputed capital
costs using the PSAF mark-up. Since they are deter-
mined by the level of clearing balances held with
Reserve Banks, it would seem more appropriate to
charge imputed deposit insurance costs against the
profits earned on clearing balances. This would
probably require a downward adjustment to the
interest rate paid on clearing balances.
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Because the Federal Reserve is a nonprofit insti-
tution, its cost of capital is not determined in capital
markets as is the case with purely private, profit-
making firms. Nevertheless, the Monetary Control
Act requires the Fed to earn a return to capital com-
parable to that earned by private firms. Conse-
quently, the Fed is faced with the task of determining
an appropriate rate of return to capital for its priced
services.
A similar problem arises in connection with public
utility regulation. While most utilities are privately
owned, their return to capital is determined by regu-
latory fiat rather than by market forces. Given the
similarity between public utility and Federal Reserve
pricing, it should not be surprising that the Fed’s
pricing methodology is patterned after rate-setting
methods developed for public utility regulation.
Rate-setting methods for regulated industries have
received a great deal of attention from economists.
Research on this topic has dealt with the problems of
identifying appropriate operational goals and develop-
ing methods of evaluating different rate-setting pro-
cedures. Although problems encountered in public
utility regulation are not identical in all respects to
those connected with Federal Reserve pricing, some
of the methods developed to analyze such rate-setting
procedures can be used to evaluate Federal Reserve
pricing methods. The analytical framework de-
veloped in this article represents a first step toward
that goal.
BUSINESS FORECASTS 1986
Edited by Sandra D. Baker
The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond is pleased to announce the publication
of Business Forecasts 1986,  a compilation of representative business forecasts for
the current year. A consensus forecast for 1986 is included. Copies may be
obtained free of charge by writing to Public Services Department, Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, P. O. Box 27622, Richmond, Virginia 23261.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 19